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Historical background 
n Early Danish start 
In the late eighties and the early nineties, the
general view in Denmark was that the
establishment of a public key infrastructure (PKI)
was an important condition for the popularisation
of electronic signatures.
In 1996, the first draft for a Danish law on
electronic signatures was prepared, to be followed
by a revised version in 1998. The ambition of the
draft bill was not only to lay down requirements
for electronic signatures and certificate issuing key
centres (“Certification Authority”), but also to
govern how electronic signatures meet
requirements in Danish law where an agreement
or exchange of messages must be in writing and
signed. Thus, the idea was that such requirements
could be fulfilled by the exchange of electronic
messages applied with an electronic signature.
The implementation of the draft bill implied a
review of the requirements as to formality in the
entire Danish legislation, which was assumed to
include more than 10,000 rules and regulations
with formal requirements for a written signature,
which would be influenced by the legislation. It
was discussed whether to pass a decision on every
single rule and regulation where an electronic
signature was to be accepted (“opt in” model), or
generally to consider electronic signatures as
fulfilling the formal requirements of the rules and
regulations unless otherwise decided concerning
the rule in question (“opt out” model).
The review was, however, somewhat time-
consuming and thus the draft bill was overtaken
by the Directive from the European Parliament on
electronic signatures and was therefore never
implemented.
n The EU Directive on electronic
signatures
On 13 December 1999, the EU issued Directive
no 99/93 on a Community framework for
electronic signatures.1 A EU Directive does not
impose direct obligations on the citizens in a
member state. The member states are, however,
obliged to implement the regulation of the
Directive into national law within a given time
limit. Dependent on the form of the Directive,
member states are left with more or less free
hands as to the actual drafting of the national
legislation.
According to the European Commission, all
countries have implemented the Directive, and
thus it may be expected that all member states
have rules on electronic signatures generally
corresponding to the Danish regulation. In
Denmark, the Directive has been implemented by
means of Lov om elektroniske signaturer, the
Danish Act on Electronic Signatures, nr. 417 of 31
May 2000 (“The Danish Act”).
Both the Directive and the Danish Act establish
general principles for the approval of electronic
signatures. Certain advanced signatures based on
qualified certificates are granted special
advantages. The Directive and the Danish Act
concentrate on the role of the centres issuing
electronic keys (“Key Centres”). Moreover, article 5
of the Directive establishes general requirements
that advanced electronic signatures based on a
qualified certificate and created by a secure
signature creation device shall be deemed to:
n comply with the legal requirements of a 
signature in relation to data in electronic form 
to the same extent that a handwritten 
signature meets these requirements in relation 
to data in paper form, and
n be admissible evidence in legal actions.
Moreover, article 5 (2) also provides that
member states must ensure that advanced
electronic signatures are not deemed legally invalid
and inadmissible evidence in legal actions only
because they
JAN HVARRE
Electronic signatures in Denmark: 








14 DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE LAW REVIEW www.deaeslr.org
1 Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community 
framework for electronic signatures (OJ 19.1.2000 L13/12).
n are electronic;
n are not based on a qualified certificate;
n are not based on a qualified certificate issued by an accredited key centre; or
n are not created by a secure signature creation device.
Finally, the Directive prohibits, as part of the general efforts to secure free movement of goods and
services between member states, that a country requires that the Key Centres must obtain prior certification.
Danish law on electronic signatures
n Scope and definitions
Efforts have been made to keep both the Directive and the Danish Act technology neutral. This appears
from the definition of an electronic signature in the Danish Act, section 3(1):
Thus, it is required that a “device” is used for creating the electronic signature. Stating your name at the
end of an e-mail will not meet this requirement. It is, however, in principle not necessary to involve a Key
Centre to meet the requirements of the definition. However, most of the provisions in the Danish Act provide
for procedures that indicate the use of a key centre in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is presumed to be the
most common procedure.
A further requirement is that a natural person must always issue the electronic signature. An electronic
signature issued by a machine will therefore not qualify as an electronic signature under the Danish Act.
n Variation of electronic signatures 
In principle, all electronic signatures are subject to the Danish Act. However, a distinction is made between
different types of signatures with different effects, depending on whether the signature is regarded (1)
“advanced”, (2) is issued based on a “qualified” certificate and (3) is created by a secure signature creation
device.
n Advanced electronic signatures
An advanced electronic signature is a signature fulfilling the following four requirements, see the Danish
Act, section 3(2):
n It must be uniquely linked to the signatory.
n It makes it possible to identify the signatory.
n It is created using means under the exclusive control of the signatory.
n It is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent change of the data is 
detectable.
Requirements 1, 2 and 4 would be met by the use of an ordinary electronic signature based on the use of
the signatory’s secret key using complete encryption or creation of a hash value of the signed message.
Requirement 3 can be met by means of prior agreement between the signatory and the receiver, or by
involving a trustworthy third party.
n Qualified certificates
In order to provide the possibility of issuing especially trustworthy certificates, both the Directive and the
Danish Act contain the concept of a “qualified certificate”. This is a protected designation, as only
certificates meeting the requirements mentioned below can be designated “qualified certificates”.
To classify as a qualified certificate, the certificate must be signed with the Certification Authorities
advanced electronic signature, see section 4(3) of the Danish Act. Moreover, according to section 4(2) the
certificate must meet the following requirements as to the level of information:
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Data i elektronisk form, der knyttes til andre
elektroniske data ved hjælp af et
signaturgenereringssystem, og som anvendes
til at kontrollere, at disse data stammer fra
den person, der er angivet som underskriver,
og at de ikke er blevet ændret.
Electronic data attached to other electronic
data by a signature creation device and 
which are used for verifying that these
originated from the person indicated as
signatory, and that they have not been
amended.
n The certificate must identify the “item” being 
qualified, and state the name and registered 
address of the Certification Authority, the 
signatory’s name or pseudonym (in such event 
specifying that it is a pseudonym) and any 
further information regarding the signatory, 
including information providing an 
unambiguous identification of the signatory.
n The qualified certificate must contain 
information regarding the validity period of the 
certificate and any limitations as to object and 
amount, which define the application of the 
certificate.
n The qualified certificate must contain an 
identification code and the signature 
verification data corresponding to the signature 
creation data, which are controlled by the 
signatory at the time of the issue.
n Secure Signature Creation Devices
Further, a distinction is made between ordinary
signature creation devices and “secure” signature
creation devices. According to the Danish Act
section 14-15, a signature creation device must
meet certain requirements to obtain the
designation “secure”. In this connection, the
Danish Act introduces a system according to which
the Danish Ministry of Science, Technology and
Innovation appoints a test centre, which is
responsible for controlling whether the signature
creation device meets the requirements. The
Ministry has not yet appointed such centre,
probably because no test centre has found it
commercially feasible to undertake this task.
Danish parties looking for verification that their
signature creation device is “secure” therefore
must contact a test centre in another member
state within EU, cf. section 15(3) of the Danish Act. 
n Legal effect of electronic
signatures
The Danish Act anticipates a situation where the
individual Danish acts generally accept electronic
messages signed electronically. Section 13 of the
Danish Act states that any requirement in the
legislation of signature on electronic messages
shall be deemed fulfilled if the message is:
n provided with an advanced electronic signature;
n based on a qualified certificate; and
n created by a secure signature creation device.
This means that any person or business
acquiring an electronic signature fulfilling the
requirements set out in the Danish Act on
Electronic Signatures can be confident of fulfilling
any future legislative requirements. At present,
only a very limited number of Danish acts provide
for the use of an electronic signature.
n Requirement for the business of
the Certification Authority: the
identification requirement 
A Certification Authority operating in Denmark
does not need to be authorized, as this would be
contrary to the EU Directive. The Certification
Authorities must, however, fulfil a number of
requirements, especially if they want to issue
qualified certificates. Some of these requirements
are laid down in a departmental order issued by
the Danish Ministry of Science, Technology and
Innovation (“the Departmental Order”)2.
First of all, the Certification Authority is required
to have a written certification policy and a
certification practice, both of which shall be made
available to the public, cf. section 2 of the
Departmental Order. Moreover, the CA must take
out an insurance covering damage arising out of
its business operations, cf. section 5 of the
Departmental Order.
Secondly in connection with the issue of
qualified certificates, the Certification Authority
must verify the identity of the person or business
by requiring physical appearance at the office of
the Certification Authority, (section 6 of the
Departmental Order), or at the office of a
representative appointed by the Certification
Authority, (section 8 of the Departmental Order).
This requirement can only be deviated from if the
Certification Authority already knows the signatory.
The requirement of physical appearance is
relatively far-reaching, especially when considering
the fact that the Certification Authority is already
motivated to perform a thorough check because
of the “presumption of negligence”, for which see
further below. The requirement is not contained in
the Directive, which only requires the use of
“appropriate means in accordance with national
law”.3
The Certification Authority may appoint other
businesses or authorities to be local registration
units performing the identity check on its behalf.
Thus, a number of Danish Certification Authorities
have chosen to issue qualified certificates using
either local post offices or banks as local
registration units in order to make is as easy as
possible for the citizens to appear in person.
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2 Bekendtgørelse nr. 923 af 5. oktober 2000 om sikkerhedskrav mv. til nøglecentre.
3 Recital 21.
Nøglecentre, der udsteder kvalificerede
certifikater til offentligheden, eller som over
for offentligheden indestår for sådanne
certifikater udstedt af et andet nøglecenter,
er ansvarlig for tab hos den, der med
rimelighed forlader sig på certifikatet,
såfremt tabet skyldes,
• at oplysningerne angivet i certifikatet 
ikke var korrekte på tidspunktet for 
udstedelsen af certifikatet,
• at certifikatet ikke indeholder alle 
oplysninger som krævet i henhold til § 4,
• manglende spærring af certifikatet, jf. §
9, stk. 2,
• manglende eller fejlagtig information 
om, at certifikatet er spærret, hvilken 
udløbsdato certifikatet har, eller om 
certifikatet indeholder formåls- eller 
beløbsbegrænsninger, jf. § 9, 
stk. 1 og 3, eller tilsidesættelse af § 7.
Stk. 2. Et nøglecenter pådrager sig
erstatningsansvar efter stk. 1, medmindre
nøglecentret kan godtgøre, at nøglecentret
ikke har handlet uagtsomt eller forsætligt.
Stk. 3. Et nøglecenter er ikke ansvarlig for
tab opstået som følge af anvendelse af et
kvalificeret certifikat uden for de
formålsbegrænsninger, som gælder for
certifikatet, eller for
tab opstået som følge af en overskridelse af
de beløbsbegrænsninger, som gælder for
certifikatet,
• forudsat at de pågældende 
begrænsninger tydeligt fremgår af 
certifikatet, jf. § 4, og på forespørgsel 
oplyses, jf. 9, stk. 1 og 3.
Stk. 4. Stk. 1-3 kan ikke ved forudgående
aftale fraviges til skade for skadelidte.
Stk. 5. Stk. 1-3 finder ikke anvendelse, i det
omfang tabet dækkes efter lov om visse
betalingsmidler.
The key centres, which issue qualified
certificates to the public, or which towards
the public vouch for such certificates issued by
another key centre, is liable for any loss
incurred by those who reasonably rely on the
certificate if the loss is due to:
• the information stated in the certificate 
not being true at the time of the issue 
of the certificate;
• the certificate not containing all 
information required under section 4;
• lack of blocking of the certificate, see 
section 9(2);
• lack of or misinformation regarding 
blocking of the certificate, expiry date 
of the certificate, or if the certificate 
contains any limitations as to objects or 
amounts, see section 9(1) and (3); or
• non-observance of section 7.
(2) A key center incurs liability pursuant to
sub-section 1 unless the key center can prove
that the key center has not acted negligently
or willfully.
(3) A key center is not liable for 
• Loss occurred in relation to the use of a 
qualified certificate beyond the 
limitations as to objects applicable to 
the certificate; or for
• loss occurred due to an excess of the 
amount limitations applicable to the 
certificate;
• provided that the said limitations are 
explicitly stated in the certificate, see 
section 4, and are notified upon inquiry
thereof, see section 9(1) and (3).
(4) Sub-section 1-3 cannot be derogated 
from to the detriment of the claimant by 
prior agreement between the parties.
(5) Sub-section 1-3 are not applicable if the
loss is covered according to the Danish Act 
on certain means of payment (lov om visse
betalingsmidler).
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As it appears, the Certification Authority is liable for damage caused to any person or business, which
reasonably relies on the certificate unless the Certification Authority can prove that it has not acted
negligently. In other words, the Certification Authority is subject to a so-called presumption of negligence.
The Certification Authority is not, however, liable for damages for loss arising out of the use of a qualified
certificate beyond the limitations as to the object and amount that applies to the certificate. Naturally, this
implies that the limitations in question are clearly stated in the certificate. The liability of the Certification
Authority cannot be derogated from to the detriment of the claimant by prior agreement between the parties.
n Liability: reversed burden of proof 
Section 11 of the Danish Act lays down a strict liability for Danish Certification Authorities issuing qualified
certificates:
The public sector as the
driving force
The public sector in Denmark has found it natural
and necessary that the use of electronic signatures
should be encouraged on the initiative of the public
authorities. The widespread use of electronic
signatures requires a certain volume, and also a
standardization that ensures that the applied devices
using PKI are compatible. In this connection, it is
important to bear in mind that the public sector
itself may save large sums if electronic signatures are
commonly used. This is because of the massive
exchange of information between citizens and
public authorities and between public authorities.
Therefore, the Danish government has launched
a project called OCES (“Offentlige Certifikater for
Elektroniske Services”, or “Public Certificates for
Electronic Services”). The purpose of the project is
to facilitate the take-up of electronic signatures
and thereby the development of electronic public
administration. The project implies the creation of
a standard PKI in which the source code for the
signature creation device is made public. The
project also implies that all Danish citizens may
obtain a free electronic signature.4
Based on a EU supply procedure5, the Danish
Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation has
appointed TDC A/S, the largest telecommunication
company in Denmark, to perform the issuing of
electronic signatures. The OCES certificate
standard covers three types of certificate:
n The personal certificate, verifying a person’s 
identity.
n The employee certificate, verifying the 
identity of a person and his or her status as 
an employee of a certain business. 
n The business certificate, verifying that the 
holder of the certificate is in fact representing 
the business stated in the certificate.
So far, the OCES certificate is only based on
software. Notwithstanding that the solution
basically intends to ensure the use of the certificate
between citizens and public authorities and among
public authorities, it can also be used in the private
sector. So far, however, primarily public authorities
offer to accept documents signed electronically by
use of the OCES signature, including schools,
colleges and universities, the tax authorities and a
number of local authorities, for instance
All Danish citizens may order a free electronic
signature by contacting TDC A/S via the internet. In
order for the signature to be issued, the citizen in
question must state his or her civil registration
number and e-mail address. TDC A/S then forwards
a unique HTML address to be used for downloading
the electronic signature by e-mail. However, the PIN
code necessary for downloading the electronic
signature is sent by ordinary mail to the physical
address listed with the residence register of the
person in question. Apart from situations where
unauthorized persons order an electronic signature
using another person’s civil registration number, and
also have access to, or is willing to force access to,
the private ordinary mail of the person in question,
the system is thus relatively secure.
The OCES signature is approved by the Danish
Data Protection Agency for use by public authorities
when exchanging sensitive information with citizens.
However, the system does not fulfil the requirement
of personal appearance, on which the issue of
qualified certificates is based (see discussion above).
Therefore, it appears somewhat peculiar that the
Danish Ministry of Science, Technology and
Innovation has chosen an identification procedure
which results in the issued certificates not meeting
the requirements set out in section 13 of the Danish
Act on Electronic Signatures. Otherwise, the OCES
signature would meet the requirements for
electronic signatures following any future legislation
in the area. However, the Ministry has probably
decided to attach the ease of obtaining an electronic
signature with greater value in order to facilitate the
highest possible take-up of the electronic signature.
The free electronic signature was made available
in March 2003. However, the distribution of the
electronic signature has not been a success so far.
Shortly after the introduction, it was possible to
complete one’s tax return by the use of electronic
signature. However, only 7,000 of Denmark’s 3.9
million taxpayers did so. At the time of writing this
article, only 145,000 Danish citizens, less than three
per cent of Denmark’s population, holds the free
OCES signature. The reason for the low take-up is
partly that many public institutions, including the
taxation authorities, still offer entry of and access to
information via the internet using a PIN code only,
partly that less than 25 per cent of the citizens
actually know that the OCES signature is free6. As
TDC will receive a bonus if it distributes the OCES
signature to at least 350,000 citizens by June 2004,
TDC has launched a marketing campaign, by which
citizens that register for the OCES signature can
participate in a competition with a trip to Disney
World in Florida is the main prize. TDC also finds
support in the fact that the numbers of public
services available through the OCES signature is
rapidly growing. Notwithstanding this development,
it is considered unlikely that TDC will issue 350,000
digital signatures in time. 
In contrast, the Danish banks have issued more
than a quarter of a million electronic signatures in
connection with home banking, without issuing any
trips to Disney World in the process. n
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5 Project competition with limited
participation under Directive 92/50/EEC
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